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Modern ID Cards and passports have 
evolved into sophisticated, complex 
positive-ID instruments that embody a 
wide variety of anti-cloning and anti-
forgery  techniques, such as: digitized  
biometrics, micro-printing, encryption, 
RFID, embedded processing, holo-
graphic overlays, and UV/IR-visible 
features, among others. This poster 
describes a practical system for 
protecting against theft of the 
enrollment stations that produce these 
ID instruments, by providing a “lock” to 
a specific location. If a protected 
enrollment system is moved from that 
location, it will fail to function. This 
non-GPS location-locking technique is 
strongly protected against sniffing and 
spoofing, is immune to relay attacks, 
and cannot be copied – not even by its 
manufacturer. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 This research provides a practical 
location-based security framework for ID 
card/passport enrollment systems that is 
highly resistant to sniffing/spoofing and is 
effectively immune to relay attacks.  
Ongoing research efforts are directed to 
refinement of the messaging protocols 
and development of a full hardware 
implementation. 
 Future related efforts will explore 
adaptation of this technique to secure 
automotive keyless-entry systems and 
similar wireless security systems against 
relay and sniffing attacks. 
System Overview  
PUFs exploit molecular-level variations in 
chip structures to create a fingerprint 
function so unique to a chip that even 
identically manufactured chips will have 
different responses. 
 The figure below shows a serial PUF 
based on tiny wiring delay differences 
where a hashed challenge word selects a 
specific combination of wiring delays for 
comparison, producing a response word. 
PUFs are inherently “noisy” so ECC is 
typically used to “stabilize” the response. 
 The security system employs a 
“Basepoint Transponder” that acts as a 
sort of “home base” for a client ID 
Enrollment Station (IDES). The BPT is 
a passively powered RFID transponder 
that would typically be embedded into a 
concrete pillar or other suitable building 
structure near the IDES. 
 The BPT/IDES communicate over a 
“conventional” RFID channel using 
asymmetric encryption, authenticated in 
both directions. The BPT and IDES 
determine a secret token from a secure 
hash of a Physical Unclonable Function 
(PUF) embedded in the BPT.  This 
token is then used in a secure, 
hardware-based, distance bounding 
protocol over a dedicated distance 
measurement channel to determine if 
distance between the IDES and BPT 
has changed. If it has, the IDES shuts 
down.  
 Secure protocols prevent spoofing 
of the token or response. Any relay 
attack will fail the TOF distance test. 
BPT Functions/Messages BPT Architecture  
 The BPT is passively-powered by the 
RFID signal and is not limited to the short 
burst communications typical of “on-the-fly” 
RFID because of the fixed installation. 
Longer carrier-on times provide sufficient 
power and time for the BPT to complete 
relatively long, compute-intensive operations.  
 To maximize speed and minimize 
software load, dedicated hardware-assist 
mechanisms are provided for key generation, 
encryption/hashing, PUF+ECC and TOF 
distance measurement. Functions not in use 
are powered down.  
 The BPT hides the PUF completely 
behind secure hash functions and encryption, 
using it only to generate encryption keys and 
TOF tokens.  The PUF is never exposed 
directly, not even to the BPT manufacturer. A 
unique ID added to the PUF prevents any 
two BPTs from producing identical tokens or 
keys. 
Figure 3. Block Diagram of Basepoint Transponder (BPT) 
• Initialize - Generate initial PUF-based 
public/private key values. 
• Verify Distance – Coordinate TOF 
token and response values.  Execute 
TOF distance sequence. 
• Transfer TA (Trusted Authority) TA 
verifies BPT, transfers TA status to new 
TA. Initial TA is manufacturer.(Includes 
public key exchange) 
• Introduce Client – TA introduces new 
client system (IDES) to BPT. (Includes 
public key exchange.) Establish initial 
distance 
• Invalidate Client – TA instructs BPT to 
invalidate previously introduced client 
system. 
Figure 1. Basic System Structure 
Physical Unclonable 
Functions (PUFs)  
Figure 2. Serial Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) 
Time-of-Flight Distance 
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